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Ryanair- The Eindhoven occurrence was initially reported and assessed by the operator as a minor event which did not warrant CVR and FDR retention.

Separate investigation into ILS Findings from the Eindhoven incident revealed characteristics of ILS signals that were not generally known.

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A second stick shaker warning occurred after the control column was relaxed and the crew again correctly initiated the stall recovery maneuver.

Boeing- During an autopilot coupled ILS approach the aircraft, flying at an altitude above the normal 3 degree glide slope, followed the fly-up signal after crossing the 9 degrees false glide slope.

In combination with the aircrafts high vertical profile and high speed in relation to the runway distance, a landing in accordance with standard operating procedures became impossible.- The flight crew did not challenge air traffic control and postponed the decision to make a go-around.

It is likely that the crews high level of confidence in the very reliable automation in the cockpit contributed to this.- The flight crew did not have proper guidance procedures to avoid false glide slope capture in relation to the distance to the runway threshold (during an autopilot coupled ILS glide slope approach from above, under instrument meteorological conditions).- The flight crew initiated the actions for the stall recovery maneuver according to the Boeing FCTM.

An investigation has been opened into the occurrence.

The airline reported that the crew disconnected the autopilot and went around due to an unstable approach and proceeded for a safe landing on the second approach 12 minutes later.

The DSB also referred to a BEA report, see Report: Air France A343 at Paris on Mar 13th 2012, intercepted mirror glide slope, large pitch oscillations and approach to stall.

On Dec 3rd 2013 the DSB made The Aviation Herald aware, that an English version of the safety warning has been released, too, and pointed out a misinterpretation of the Dutch version in The Aviation Herald's original summary concerning the 9 degrees mirror glide path. Eindhoven offers a runway 03/21 of 3000 meters/9840 feet length featuring ILS Category I (OCH 185 feet for runway 03, OCH 179 feet for runway 21) and NDB/DME approaches to both runways 03 and 21.

These findings led the Dutch Safety Board to conclude that unknown ILS signal characteristics pose a significant threat to aviation safety and the Board decided to address this issue separately.

The main conclusions of the separate investigation were:- The ILS Image Type antenna category signal characteristics of false glide paths and corresponding cockpit instrument warnings do not correspond with generally received wisdom and training.- Signal Reversal sometimes occurs at approximately 6 degree glide path and always at the 9 degree glide path angle.

The Dutch Onderzoeksraad (DSB, Dutch Safety Board) reported on Jun 19th, that on May 31st 2013 a Boeing 737-800 went around at Eindhoven, during the go-around the speed decreased.

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